The Demonstration Phase for Carbon Capture and Storage: The case for public support. CEPS Policy Briefs No. 174, 2 October 2008 by Egenhofer, Christian.
Christian Egenhofer is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels. 
This paper draws on the work of the CEPS Task Force on the EU ETS review. 
CEPS Policy Briefs present concise, policy-oriented analyses of topical issues in European affairs, with the aim of 
interjecting the views of CEPS researchers and associates into the policy-making process in a timely fashion. Unless 
otherwise indicated, the views expressed are attributable only to the author in a personal capacity and not to any 
institution with which they are associated. 
 
Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (http://www.ceps.eu) y © CEPS 2008 
 
 
No. 174 y October 2008 
 
 
 
arbon capture and storage (CCS) is seen as 
a key technology, without which the 
achievement of EU and global climate 
change targets will be extremely difficult. In order 
to reach these targets, the EU aims to have CCS 
technology available on a commercial basis as of 
2020, which adds a certain sense of urgency to the 
endeavour. To this end, in 2007, the European 
Council announced up to 12 large-scale CCS 
demonstration plants.
1   No decision on possible 
public financial support has so far been taken.  
1.  What case for the public support of 
demonstration? 
There is no consensus in the literature on whether 
full-scale demonstration requires public support 
and even less so about the level of support required. 
The solution depends very much on the 
technologies available. In competitive markets, i.e. 
in a deregulated environment, energy supply or 
industrial companies tend to shift their technology 
development and demonstration towards projects 
with a short-term payback and away from projects 
with a high level of economic or technology risk or 
very long times, such as carbon capture and 
storage. Private risk-capital therefore tends to 
engage only after successful demonstration. A 
study by Mc Kinsey & Company
2 suggests  that 
early demonstration projects will typically cost 
between € 60-90 per tonne of CO2. 
Demonstration is different from the deployment of 
technology. Demonstration describes a prototype 
that is set up with the primary purpose of 
                                                      
1 This package has been complemented by a proposal to 
develop a legal framework for CCS, which is currently 
pending adoption by the Council and Parliament.   
2 McKinsey & Company, Carbon Capture and Storage: 
Assessing the Economics, 2008 
showcasing the idea, testing performance or the 
method and the features of the product and, in the 
case of CCS, to develop the infrastructure. 
Demonstration aims at investors, partners, the 
public or potential customers in order to convince 
them of the viability of the chosen approach. In 
addition, there are important network effects – 
comparable to network externalities.
3  The  first 
demonstration installation needs to create the 
infrastructure (e.g. pipelines, storage site etc.), 
which the following installations can use too. It is 
assumed that the first demonstration projects are 
undertaken in clusters so that infrastructure can be 
used by different projects. Technology deployment 
policies aim at speeding up the use (i.e. deployment 
of) a tested (i.e. already demonstrated) technology. 
The primary aim of such deployment policies – as 
in the case of renewables – is reducing the costs to 
make these technologies competitive.  Studies by 
the International Energy Agency, for example, 
indicate that for each doubling of capacity of 
renewable technologies (except wind), the costs 
decrease by between 15-19%.
4 Some  also  argue 
that there are certain ‘learning curve’ effects (cost 
savings with the deployment of the technology) for 
CCS, in particular in the area of energy efficiency.  
But the level of these effects remains controversial.   
                                                      
3 Network externality has been defined as a change in 
the benefit that an agent derives from a good when the 
number of other agents consuming the same kind of 
good changes. They occur if participants in the market 
fail to internalise these effects. 
4  IEA  (2006),  Energy Technology Perspectives. 
OECD/IEA, Paris 
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Be this as it may, it can be argued that in light of 
the urgency of making CCS commercially available 
for power plants or industrial installations, it could 
be seen as a ‘public good’. This is so because CCS 
can avoid the lock-in of conventional coal power 
plants which, for reasons of economy and security 
of supply, often remains the technology of choice, 
even in the EU but more so in countries such as 
China or India, where few or no alternatives to coal 
exist in the short term.  There is thus a compelling 
rationale for the public to financially support CCS 
demonstration.   
2.  What level and source of support? 
Even if one agrees in principle that there is a need 
for public financial support, this still does not 
answer the question of how much support and 
where the money should come from. According to 
the analysis of the European Commission’s Impact 
Assessment,
5 the best option would be to establish 
an EU coordination mechanism, dealing inter alia 
with ways of providing private and public support.  
Ultimately, the Impact Assessment remained 
ambiguous about the possible public contribution to 
CCS demonstration. 
The European Commission has included CCS in 
the EU ETS, i.e. stored CO2 will not be required to 
surrender EU allowances. It refrained however 
from proposing to grant (additional) free 
allowances for the capture, transportation or 
storage of greenhouse gas emissions. Industry 
argues that additional financial support was needed 
for the demonstration phase. Without such support, 
large-scale demonstration projects would not be 
built, notwithstanding that some small scale 
projects are underway. Industry also argues that the 
need for public support will rapidly decrease as 
infrastructure develops and costs come down.   
3.  What next?  
At this stage, it seems highly unlikely that the 12 
demonstration plants will be built without 
additional support, at least at the pace needed to 
make the technology commercially available by 
2020.    
Since the decision to build the demonstration plants 
was an EU one, financial support should ideally 
come from the EU budget. There appears to be no 
                                                      
5  European  Commission  (2008),  Supporting Early 
Demonstration of Sustainable Power Generation from 
Fossil Fuels – Impact Assessment. Commission Staff 
Working Document, SEC(2008) 47, 23.01.2008; p. 6  
realistic possibility of making the necessary money 
available in the EU budget, however. This sends 
the responsibility back to the member states. While 
progressively significant amounts of additional 
resources will become available for member states 
in the form of auctioning receipts (in excess of € 30 
billion at a conservative estimate), this money will 
only become available around 2012. This will be 
too late. Stakeholders are therefore looking to the 
EU ETS, i.e. using part of the New Entrants 
Reserve – the free allowances that will be granted 
to new investors. Currently, the possibility of using 
up to €500 million is being discussed, i.e. 
approximately €15 billion in total at a price of €30 
per EU allowance. Member states and especially 
new member states, where most of the New 
Entrants Reserve is likely to be used, will tend to 
oppose such a solution for fear that it deters new 
investment.  This also raises the question of the 
share of industry participation.  
Against the background of this discussion, three 
items stand out in particular.  
First, the ‘EU mode’ of setting targets can only 
work if such targets are linked to credible 
implementation plans.  Ambiguity is not an option. 
Otherwise, the EU and its member states risk 
facing another credibility gap, internally and 
externally, notably in international climate 
negotiations. This has been documented in an 
earlier CEPS Policy Brief.
6 
Second, there is a risk that the EU ETS is used to 
pursue other objectives than those of GHG 
reduction, such as energy policy, social, industrial 
or financial goals. A better solution for CCS 
demonstration funding would be to use member 
state budgetary resources rather than linking it to 
the EU ETS.   
Third, the finance issue raises the question of 
whether CCS should not also expand beyond fossil 
fuel emissions and include CO2  emissions of a 
biological origin, such as from the combustion of 
wood or the fermentation processes involved in the 
production of food and drinks. This would raise 
some registry questions, but these can be solved, 
however.   
Whatever the final solution, at this stage we can 
identify a number of core principles  that any 
solution should meet:  
a)  Given the urgency with which CCS will be 
needed on a commercial basis, and taking 
                                                      
6 Egenhofer, C, Looking for the cure-all? Targets and 
the new EU Energy Strategy. CEPS Policy Brief No. 118 The Case for Public Support for the Demonstration Phase for Carbon Capture and Storage | 3 
account both of the high commercial risk 
involved and initial infrastructure costs, a case 
can be made for CCS as a quasi ‘public good’ 
that will need additional financial support for 
the demonstration phase. The need for public 
support will rapidly decrease as infrastructure 
develops and costs come down.  
b) To use this support most efficiently and 
effectively,  it: 
i)  must be able to support investment 
decisions immediately 
ii)  should ideally be operated at EU level 
(to be non-discriminatory across the 
EU) 
iii)  should be limited in scale and time 
iv)  awarded on a competitive basis  
v)  performance-based (e.g. rewards CO2 
stored)  
vi)  independent of the source of the CO2 
vii)  while rapidly decreasing as more 
demonstration projects are developed. 
In general, the uptake of demonstration projects is 
likely to be facilitated by a stable legal framework 
for CCS as well as by a predictable and ambitious 
CO2 cap. 
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